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Perhaps the customary approach to designing a management infor
mation system has been all wrong. The authors report on a case
where they merely asked each manager what results were vital to
him and then provided the information necessary—

THE KEY-RESULT APPROACH TO DESIGNING
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
by Heinz A. Burgstaller and John D. Forsyth
Queen's University

the problem of or
ganizing and communicating the
information required to operate an
organization, the president of the
General Electric Company once
observed:

far more penetrating and orderly
study of the business in its entirety,
to discover what specific informa
tion is needed at each particular
position in view of the decisions to
be made there.”1

“This deep problem of communi
cation is not solved by providing
more volume of data for all con
cerned, or even by faster accumu
lation and transmittal of conven
tional data, or by wider distribu
tion of previously existing data, or
through holding more conferences.
Indeed, the belief that such meas
ures. will meet the communica
tions challenge is probably one of
the great fallacies in business and
managerial thinking.
“What is required, instead, is a

Interestingly enough, this ex
tremely perceptive remark was not
made recently. It came from Ralph
J. Cordiner almost two decades ago.
The purpose of this article is to
specifically consider the problem
raised by him.
As recently as 1960, one would
have been very hard pressed to find

n considering

I
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1 Cordiner, Ralph J., New Frontiers for
Professional Managers, McKinsey Foun
dation Lecture Series, New York, Mc
Graw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956.

any courses on management infor
mation systems in the curricula of
universities whose programs in
cluded formal studies of manage
ment processes. While business, in
dustry, and governmental agencies
were adopting ever more complex
versions of the products produced
by the post-war information tech
nology revolution, universities neg
lected to institute teaching and re
search in how to use this new tech
nology efficiently and effectively to
create management information
systems. The scholarly literature,
for instance, is virtually devoid of
any reference to management infor
mation systems prior to the mid1960s.
Understandably, business, indus
try, and government did not wait
19

What information should be
produced by management

information systems? It is
this question we shall con

sider here. Specifically, we
shall outline a method for
identifying the information

requirements of manage
ment. We shall indicate the
difficulties and pitfalls we

have experienced in actually

employing this method.

Finally, we shall describe a
case in which this method
has been successfully
utilized.
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until universities introduced educa
tional activities in this field. Com
petitive pressures on the one hand
and an infectious, imitative drive
on the other prodded them to
plunge ahead on their own. The
number of failures was embarrass
ingly large because the developed
information systems turned out to
be very attractive technical struc
tures with no organic life.
However, this developmental
strategy, disastrous as it proved for
some firms and less than satisfac
tory for most, was not as irrational
as hindsight would tempt us to
believe. The designing and install
ing of management information
systems was seen, then, as primarily
a technical problem rather than a
management problem. And, as such,
it was best solved by technical spe
cialists, namely, system analysts and
computer programers. Managers
were strengthened in this false be
lief by the sellers of computing
equipment, who hid the new tech
nology behind a formidable barrier
of newly developed professional jar
gon while making extravagant
claims and promises as to the per
formance of their “systems.” When
promised information systems did
not materialize, managers realized
that they had to get involved per
sonally.
The study of management infor
mation systems is now a formal part
of the educational program of most
undergraduate and graduate stu
dents in business administration. In
spite of such educational innova
tions, however, we have still failed
to recognize the real problem of
management information systems—
the problem which leads to many
failures of management information
systems in practice. We have not
identified or understood the kinds
of information needs which are to
be served by management informa
tion systems. In other words, thus
far we have failed in our efforts to
identify what information is man
agement information. Indeed, we
have not even acknowledged this
as a key problem area. It is aston
ishing that the sentiments of Mr.
Cordiner have not provoked more

concrete reactions from the busi
ness and academic communities.2
What information should be pro
duced by management information
systems? It is this question that we
shall consider here. Specifically, we
shall outline a method for identi
fying the information requirements
of management. We shall also indi
cate the difficulties and pitfalls that
we have experienced in actually
employing this method. Finally, we
shall describe a case in which this
method has ben successfully util
ized.
The method, outlined below, for
identifying a manager’s informa
tion requirements is bound to fail.
However, a consideration of the
method does allow us to develop
an approach which does succeed.
The Scenario: Suppose that we
are members of a staff group or
task force charged with the respon
sibility of identifying the informa
tion needs of our organization’s
managers.
Suppose we simply proceed with
a series of face-to-face interviews
with the following statements:
We are going to design and im
plement a management information
system. Tell us what information
you want.

There are at least five different
negative responses that we might
receive to this request. We can ex
amine these responses by consider
ing five “typical” managers, namely,
the Bottomless-Pit Manager, the
Accounting Information Manager,
the In-Basket Manager, the ClosedDoor Manager, and the Mississippi
Gambler.
This examination via caricatures
assists us, in turn, in developing a
successful method for identifying
management’s information require
ments.
2 A recent survey of the literature on
management information systems has re
vealed that this area is still a relatively
barren land. See Salomone, Peter, “Sur
vey of Methods for Determining Informa
tion Requirements,” paper presented at
the 12th American Meeting of the Insti
tute of Management Science, October,
1971.
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The Bottomless-Pit Manager:
“Tell us what information you
want.”
This manager responds with one
word—“Everything.”
He says he needs all the infor
mation we can give him. He ex
presses, literally, an insatiable ap
petite for information.
What this manager is really say
ing, though, is that his job is so
big, so wide-ranging, so important,
that he needs to know all there is
to know. At the same time, he is
really confessing that he cannot an
ticipate the requirements of his job.
Moreover, he probably feels that
if he were to start identifying spe
cific information requirements he
would be simultaneously specifying
his perception of the limits of his
responsibilities and control. The
last thing this manager wants to do
is to paint himself into a corner.
So instead he takes a defensive
position by implicitly staking out a
sphere of responsibility that is
wider than any human manager
can hope to handle.
The Bottomless-Pit Manager
wants everything, including copi
ous quantities of information.
Of course, one has serious reser
vations as to what any manager
could possibly do with unlimited
quantities of information. If his of
fice were to become a depository
for information, a bottomless pit,
he would most likely become com
pletely surfeited with it. Informa
tion would become master of the
manager. The tail would wag the
dog.
The Accounting-Information Man
ager: “Tell us what information
you want.”
This manager instinctively thinks
of management information as
being synonymous with financial
data. He sees information in terms
of dollars and cents and in this
vein he can be very articulate and
unambiguous in identifying his in
formation needs. He finds the pros
pect of having information giving
the ratio of weekly labor variances
to accumulated payroll expenses
genuinely exciting. Unfortunately,
this manager not only has a serious
May-June, 1973

There are certain well-defined types who can cause trouble in designing a work
able management information system: the Bottomless-Pit manager who always
wants "everything". . .

misconception of management in
formation, but he has also lost a
proper perspective of the function
of a business organization.
A manager who focuses on the fi
nancial data which are produced
by the accounting system fails to
appreciate the real processes which
his authority and responsibilities
embrace. He is ignoring the fact
that his job involves him in the
process of acquiring real resources,
of transforming these into real prod
ucts and services, and of promoting
and distributing these outputs to
consumers. The Accounting-Infor
mation Manager perceives only part
of his job, and not the important
part at that.
Unfortunately, financial account
ing processes are so embedded in
our organizations that some man
agers find it impossible to divorce
accounting systems from informa
tion systems and to differentiate
between data and information.
Probably only a small fraction of
any management information is apt
to fit into a multi-column ledger
system. And our predispositions

should not limit us to such a
structure.
The In-Basket Manager: “Tell us
what information you want.”
This manager’s reaction to our
question is a conditioned reflex: he
examines his “in-basket.” This
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Balance Sheet

. . . the Accounting-Information Manager who is interested in absolutely noth
ing but dollars and cents and can find variances genuinely exciting . . .

manager’s perception of his job,
though perhaps subconscious, is
that he is being paid to fight fires.
And management information, to
him, is any information that he
needs to deal with the problems
which currently occupy his “inbasket.”
Such an approach to manage
ment information requirements is,
of course, rather myopic. It is symp
tomatic of the manager’s tendency
to become so immersed in prob
lems in the “in-basket” that he loses
a true perspective of the purposes
of management information. Fur
thermore, quite often this manager’s
information requirements consist of
information having only sporadic
or episodic value. Even under the
best of circumstances it will be
very difficult to distill genuine in
formation needs out of fighting
brush fires.
It would be informative to re
time and stage manage a second
interview with this manager. Im
mediately prior to his return from
a vacation, we might empty his “inbasket” and, then, as soon as he
22

returns, we could repeat our ques
tion about his information needs.
Unfortunately, our question would
most likely produce a functional
psychotic.
The Closed-Door Manager: “Tell
us what information you want”
This manager’s response is just
the opposite to that of the Bottom
less-Pit Manager. The Closed-Door
Manager asserts that he has all the
information that he needs.
But, like the Bottomless-Pit Man
ager’s response, this reply also sig
nals defensiveness. This manager
apparently believes that if he were
to admit to needing more or dif
ferent information he would also
be confessing that he has not been
performing his job satisfactorily for
lack of an appropriate knowledge
base. To admit to having informa
tion needs would be unthinkable.
This manager is an individual
who clings to those qualifications
which are acquired through expe
rience. But even if all his present
information needs, as dictated by
his experience, were being satis
fied, he would still fail to appreci

ate that his job is likely to be
changing as well.
Experience is a valuable asset.
However, in a dynamic environ
ment it is easy to overvalue expe
rience and, to the extent that infor
mation needs are co-mingled with
experience, it is easy to overvalue
them, too. Information needs
change, but not behind a “closeddoor.”
The Mississippi Gambler: “Tell
us what information you want.”
This manager will also reply that
he has no additional or different
information needs.
While this manager’s response
is the same as that of the ClosedDoor Manager, his motivations are
subtly different. Indeed, the rea
sons underpinning this manager’s
response provide us with an im
portant clue as to why this direct
approach to identifying a manager’s
information needs meets with little,
if any, success.
The Mississippi Gambler plays
his cards close to his chest. He sim
ply does not care to reveal his in
formation requirements. He looks
at information as a resource from
which flows a certain amount of
power. Thus, the Mississippi Gam
bler will refuse to “tip his hand,”
even though it is only to reveal his
information requirements, unless he
can see the value in doing so. More
over his interest and cooperation
will only be obtained if he sees the
benefits derived from specifying his
information requirements outweigh
ing his perceived “costs” of identi
fying the information requirements
of his job. The Mississippi Gambler
is only willing to give up some
power if he expects to gain more
than an offsetting amount in return.
With his guard up, the Missis
sippi Gambler’s behavior suggests
a very genuine question: “What’s
in it for me?” This question should
have been carefully considered by
the task force before they started
their interviews because there is a
major problem demonstrated in the
approach outlined above. Walking
into a manager’s office and asking
him what information he needs, or
wants, presents him with a very
difficult question. The asking of
Management Adviser

what information is needed, or
wanted, puts all the emphasis on
the word “information.” The focus
of attention on “information”
amounts to dealing with a very
abstract concept; whereas informa
tion should be appreciated for what
it is—a resource and, as such, a
means to achieving organizational
objectives. And combined with its
value as a resource are the costs of
acquiring and using it. Manage
ment information is not a free good.
The Accounting-Information Man
ager and the In-Basket Manager
failed to appreciate what was meant
by management information.
The Bottomless-Pit Manager and
the Closed-Door Manager failed to
acknowledge the “costs” associated
with having too much or irrelevant
management information.
The Mississippi Gambler was re
luctant to discuss his information
needs because he could not see any
“payoff” to him for doing so.
In order to identify the informa
tion needs of these managers we
should have begun by stepping
backwards from that question and
we should have considered, instead,
why they need information.
Key-result areas

A manager, any individual in the
management function, carries out
three types of activities: He plans;
He executes; He reviews. The plan
ning activity leads into the execu
tion activity, which leads into the
review activity, which leads into
the planning activity, and so on in
such a manner that the activities
are continuous, melding one into
the other.
Does a manager need informa
tion when he plans his operations?
Does a manager need information
when he executes his plans? Does
a manager need information when
he reviews the executed plans? Ob
viously, the answer to each of these
questions is emphatically “yes.”
This consideration of the manage
ment cycle leads us to a method for
identifying management informa
tion requirements which we shall
call the Key-Result-Areas approach.
The Scenario: Suppose, again,
May-June, 1973

. . . the In-Basket Manager whose first reaction is to examine his In-Basket to
see what today's problems are . . .

that we are members of a staff
group having the responsibility for
identifying the information needs
of our organization’s managers. An
approach to identifying, success
fully, these needs consists of three
steps. It is interesting to note that
only the final step deals with in
formation as such.

portant thing for him to do this
year is “open up” the California
market for his company’s product.
That is, he has to pick up a share
of the market in the Los Angeles
and San Francisco area. If he suc
ceeds he has a promotion, while if
he fails . . . His company’s success
in California is a Key-Result Area
for this manager.

Beginning the interview

Key-Result Areas: We could ini
tiate each interview by asking the
manager to consider for himself the
following questions:

In what areas, covered by my re
sponsibilities and authority, is per
formance critically important?
Where must I really perform?
Where am I “under the gun”?

These questions are designed to
have the manager focus upon an
area of decision making which is
probably quite small. The assump
tion is that although every manager
may be required to make many de
cisions, there are, in fact, only a
few decisions which are critical.
The marketing manager, for ex
ample, may feel that the most im

The next question

The Management Cycle: After a
manager has identified his Key-Re
sult Areas, we can then shift his
attention to the following question:
With respect to those identified
areas in which results are critical,
what decisions are required in plan
ning, executing, and reviewing
your activities?

Here we have the manager con
sider the management cycle as it
applies to his Key-Result Areas.
To continue our illustration, the
marketing manager is asked to con
sider the decisions or choices he
has and must make in managing his
Key-Result Areas. He has to decide
on a promotion plan. What adver23

. . . the Closed-Door manager who won't admit he needs any information he's
not getting now . . .

tising media should he use? Should
he separate the promotional activi
ties for California from the rest of
the country.
Information Requirements: The
final step in this process is con
cerned with identifying the infor
mation requirements and can be
approached by means of the fol
lowing questions:

With respect to the management
cycle of planning, executing, and
reviewing, in those areas in which
performance is critical, what classes
of information do you need? That
is, what kinds of knowledge would
you like to have in making deci
sions relative to the planning activ
ities, execution activities, and re
view activities?
These final questions place infor
mation in its proper perspective.
In developing his promotion plans,
the marketing manager needs in
formation about his potential cus
tomers in Los Angeles and San
24

Francisco. He needs information
about the advertising media. He
needs information about the pro
motional activities of his competi
tors. This information is manage
ment information. Moreover, by
following this sequence of steps,
the analyst can make the manager
recognize the value of information.
Information becomes a resource
need in the identical sense in
which other resources such as
money, manpower, and machines
are required by the manager. In
formation is required in order to
get results.
A case study

The Key-Result Areas approach
for determining management’s in
formation requirements was re
cently utilized in a very large Ca
nadian governmental organization.
And the approach proved to be
successful.
Seventy-eight middle and upper
level managers in the governmental
organization were interviewed, us

ing the method outlined above.
These managers headed establish
ments located in all parts of Can
ada from British Columbia to New
foundland. In most cases the estab
lishments were heavily engaged in
research and development activi
ties.
The task force or study team
conducting the interviews consisted
of four men, only one of whom
was a member of the Federal civil
service. The other individuals were
“loaned” to the Government for
the purpose of the study, their usual
environments being business organ
izations. The study team enjoyed the
full and active support of the senior
management of the organization.
This support combined with the
relative anonymity of the study
team members proved to be neces
sary but not sufficient conditions
for the success of the study.
The analysts, working in pairs,
were accompanied at each inter
view by an experienced stenogra
pher who made notes of the main
points of the interview and pre
pared a typed summary of the in
terview the same day. This sum
mary was then reviewed by both
interviewers and used by them to
prepare a set of statements describ
ing the information requirements
which had been identified during
the interview. Copies of these state
ments of information requirements
were, in turn, given to each inter
viewee for his verification, a very
important step which was required
in order to provide credibility to
the study results in the eyes of sen
ior management.
In total, the study team identified
350 information requirements for
the 78 managers. Because of over
lapping requirements it was, how
ever, possible to finally condense
these 350 requirements into 13
classes of key information needs.
Before this step, each manager was
given an opportunity to comment
on the findings of the study and
make suggestions concerning the
distillation of these key information
requirements from the 350 tentative
requirements produced by the in
terviews. At the end of the four
month period required to complete
Management Adviser

the study, the project team pre
sented their findings to the senior
management of the organization.
The results of the study served
to underscore the importance of
identifying the information require
ments before developing system
structures for management infor
mation. The 13 key information re
quirements, which the study pro
duced, were necessarily of a broad,
general nature. They covered both
internal and environmental infor
mation. Moreover, because of the
obvious interdependencies of the
planning, executing, and reviewing
activities of the managers, the key
information needs were highly in
terrelated. But this does not mean
that a monolithic, integrated, com
puterized management information
system is necessarily the preferred
vehicle for satisfying the key in
formation requirements. Although
such a system is perhaps techno
logically feasible, integration and
computerization have steeply rising
organizational costs due to the in
creasing system complexity and the
growing dehumanization of the
man-machine system. These costs
were abundantly clear to the man
agers. Indeed, throughout its entire
survey of management, the project
team consciously avoided any refer
ences to computerized information
systems for satisfying the needs of
managers. As indicated above, the
objective of the study was to iden
tify the key information needs.
That objective was met.
In closing our reference to this
actual case we can add that the
report of the project team was ac
cepted by the senior management
of the Government organization.
And since that time, the organiza
tion has become actively engaged
in the development of a number of
systems to satisfy the key informa
tion needs.
Conclusion

At the outset of this discussion
we considered an admonition from
Ralph J. Cordiner. The Key-ResultAreas approach for identifying man
agement’s information requirements
May-June, 1973

. . . and the Mississippi Gambler, who plays his cards so close to his chest that
he won't admit anything, won't say he either needs information or that he
doesn't need it. Information, to him, is power; he is only willing to yield some
of it if he can see an immediate payoff for himself.

offers a response to Mr. Cordiner’s
challenge.
Individual managers, not just the
organization, command the spot
light in the Key-Result-Areas ap
proach. Notwithstanding the iner
tial forces which tend to institu
tionalize decision-making in organ
izations, especially large organiza
tions, individual managers ulti
mately make decisions. Individual
managers have responsibility and
control. It is the individual man
ager who must get results. There
are critical areas of performance
facing every manager. For these
reasons, the Key-Result-Areas ap
proach for identifying information
needs focuses upon individual
managers.
No attempt is made to capture
all possible information needs but
only those related to Key-Result
Areas. This approach concentrates
on critical areas of performance
and, hence, is concerned with se
lecting a relatively few number of
information needs. This approach
then drastically reduces the com
plexity of the resulting information

system designed to satisfy the needs.
Simultaneously, the information sys
tem remains effective in terms of
the functions it is designed to serve
by virtue of the fact that it relates
to critical areas of performance.
The Key-Result-Areas approach
is not a normative approach to man
agement information. No attempt is
made to identify information man
agers ought to have but, rather, this
approach is pragmatic. It results in
the identification of information
that managers need and can use.
The needs are not armchaired. The
needs arise from the perspective
gained in concentrating upon the
decision-making process in KeyResult Areas. Moreover, managers
by virtue of their involvement in
identifying information needs are
apt to be very receptive to having
information systems designed and
implemented for their use.
We conclude, ourselves, on a
very pragmatic note. The KeyResult-Areas approach works. We
have seen it utilized in one of the
most difficult managerial systems—
a Government organization.
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